IOS–Enabled Control in Mobile Service Partnership - A Case Study by Nie, Lei & Zhang, Jinlong
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
ICEB 2009 Proceedings International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) 
Winter 12-4-2009 
IOS–Enabled Control in Mobile Service Partnership - A Case Study 
Lei Nie 
Jinlong Zhang 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/iceb2009 
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) at AIS Electronic 
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEB 2009 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS 
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
 
The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009 
IOS–ENABLED CONTROL IN MOBILE SERVICE PARTNERSHIP-A CASE STUDY 
 
Lei Nie1, Jinlong Zhang2 





In mobile service partnership (MSP for short), 
partners’ opportunism has become a serious question 
which obsessed mobile network operators (MNO for 
short) and impedes healthy growth of mobile 
services chain. For loose-coupled inter-
organizational cooperation partnership, the 
implementation of formal control is often faced with 
many challenges. Meanwhile, mobile 
communication service industry is one of highest-
level IT/IS equipped sector, how IT/IS affects 
control mechanism in MSP is the main objective of 
this study. 
Drawing from a typical case study, we identify 
what characteristics of MSP are more vulnerable to 
inclination of opportunism. On the other hand, we 
report the significant role that interorganizational 
system (IOS)-enabled process control played in 
curbing opportunism in MSP from this case. Lastly, 
we conclude some managerial implication of our 
study. 
 




Telecommunications is one of the most turbulent 
industries in today's economy. Among this industry, 
the fast growth of mobile value-added service has 
acquired high attention and was predicted as the 
most potential business in incoming “3G” era. 
In the mobile service sector, MNOs and service 
providers/content providers (hereafter we all use SPs 
to refer to both two unless otherwise specified) 
formed a unique cooperative relationship. [1] 
identified relationship between MNO and its partners 
as a virtual and global one which enacted through an 
inter-organizational information system (IIS). [2] 
called this relationship “strategic community”, 
specifically, partnership between mobile operator 
and SPs as “Portal community”. As the former focus 
on communication medium and the latter 
emphasized strategic attribute of this partnering, this 
relationship is supposed to be learned from different 
angles. 
In line with prior literatures which studied 
telecom partnership, we think, MNO and SPs have 
established a cooperative strategic alliance 
partnership but with its distinguishing feature. Both 
of two parties focused on their own specialty, 
therefore joint surplus can be created only through 
melting by complementary skills, routines and 
capabilities of specialized partners [3]. Using Das’s 
analogue that opportunistic behaviors by partners are 
like “thorns on the stems of roses” [4], alliance 
solely pursuing fast growth was easily exposed to the 
hidden “thorns”. Opportunistic behavior of one or 
more partners to an alliance is often suggested as a 
primary cause for the failure of an alliance to achieve 
the goals and purposes of the partners [5]. 
Control in alliances is generally viewed as a 
process of regulation and monitoring for the 
achievement of desired alliance goal [6]. In MSP, 
control is implemented by controller (operator) to 
influence controllee (service providing partners) 
through a variety of governing actions. The main 
purpose of control is reduction of goal incongruence 
and interest divergence among organizational 
members. Although control can be costly and 
challenging, it is often presumed necessary to curb 
opportunism [7].  
We focus on formal control in alliance. There 
are two main modes of formal control: 1) Outcome 
control, which refers to the prespecification by the 
controller of desired controllee outputs and the 
associated evaluation criteria; 2) process (or 
behavior) control, which refers to prescribing the 
methods and procedures that the controllee should 
follow [8]. The two forms of control play different 
part in curbing opportunism. Outcome control, 
similar to market mechanism, can effectively avoid 
“free-ride” behavior of alliance partners; 
comparatively, process control by regulating the 
conduct of partners to prevent major surprise may 
effectively reduce opportunism in a more direct way.  
Process control increases the ability to detect 
opportunism, and accordingly make rewards and 
sanctions to the partner's behavior more 
appropriately [9]. Moreover, from a behavioral 
perspective, the monitoring process itself may place 
uncomfortable social pressure on a party and thereby 
increase compliance [10]. 
As the new form of internet-based fraud 
emerging, some academic interest has transferred to 
more advanced IOS controls, such as EDI controls 
[11]. However, existing literatures on IOS and 
organizational control are limited, most of them 
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focus on EDI [12][13], and Organizational context, 
technology factors, task characteristics and relational 
factors are suggested to influence EDI control. 
Although the purpose of IOS is to enhance 
cooperation and control, some practical works claim 
IOS often merely play a part in monitoring [14].  
As there are few studies concerning how IOS is 
used to control over partners’ opportunistic 
behaviors, and IOS served in mobile service sector 
usually has surpass the scope of “information links” 
or “electronic market”[15]. So the study in this filed 
still needs more specific evidence and understanding. 
In this study, we want to explore these 
questions: How does focal firm govern partners’ 
opportunistic behavior effectively? As a typical 
virtual partnering relationship, we also want to know 
what role that IOS played in alliance control, and 
further more in curbing opportunism in MSP. 
For seeking evidence to answer the questions 
we interested, a specific case is leveraged to find 
answers. Firstly, we extensively collect 
documentation and report material about China 
Mobile and its value-added service chain. An 
interview to several experts, including three 
managers in China Mobile and two managers in 
main SP to verify data we used, meanwhile, their 
insights on the above research questions have been 
organized to develop our proposition.  
The Rest sections outline our analyses and 
results; and discuss the implications of the study. 
Lastly, we conclude some managerial implication of 
our study, and index the limitations of our study, 
suggest directions for further research. 
 
Case study 
China Mobile Communications Corporation (“China 
Mobile” for short) is the world’s largest mobile 
telecom operator in terms of network scale and 
subscriber base. By 2008, the number of subscribers 
has reached 400 million. 
China Mobile and SPs cooperated in the open 
and mutual beneficial basis mainly through 
“Monternet” business model which launched by 
China Mobile in 2000. From initial mainly focusing 
on SMS-based value added services, the 
“Monternet” business has become synthesized 
mobile services including various types of wireless 
data services and voice value-added business.  
In China Mobile and value-added service 
providers partnering development process, there has 
several distinctive key stages:  
Prior to August 2004, the value-added business 
was in its infancy. China Mobile attracted partner to 
its “open value chain” without serious selection just 
running for high speed. The qualification of SPs is 
uneven. Some SPs adopted deceitful behaviors to 
pursue high profit. Since lack of corresponding 
regulations and sanctions, their misconduct didn’t 
accept enough punishments. Meantime, although 
high profit stimulate fast growth of value-added 
services, the misconducts of SPs also affect interests 
of subscribers seriously and lower their confidence 
to mobile value-added services. The whole services 
chain was affected consequently.  
Facing this case, both the MNOs and 
government regulator step up efforts on the 
regulating and managing of SPs from 2004. At the 
same time, China Mobile also strengthened the 
supervision of SPs and issued some regulations.  
In the end of 2004, China Mobile constructed a 
data service management platform (DSMP) system 
named MISC (mobile information system center, 
more detailed introduction and process reengineering 
see Appendix). The management of contracted SPs 
was transferred in this powerful platform in 
succession. 
Meantime, China Mobile prescribed a series of 
new methods to implement control. In the starting of 
cooperation, the outcome control implemented by 
China Mobile only focuses on partners’ business 
performance. When recognized that opportunism has 
damaged the whole alliance’ interests and reputation, 
China Mobile began to evaluated partners’ 
performances based on both business performance 
and credit.  
From October 2005, China Mobile introduced 
credit score approach to manage SPs in Monternet, 
which is based on credit assessment of SPs 
negatively to their irregularity. The credit score 
approach mainly measures SPs’ trustworthiness, 
business and service quality, not including operating 
income. The indicators of credit score management 
have three dimensions including: SPs’ violation, 
customer complaints, and the fulfillment of contract. 
The low-level credit SPs will subject to punishment 
from business suspension until the termination of 
operation. The high-level credit SPs have 
qualification to participate China Mobile‘s “leveled 
management” in which SPs will obtain different 
resource support from China Mobile according to 
their business performances. 
Since there methods were adopted, the 
opportunistic behaviors of partners were held up 
effectively. For instance, according to the public 
financial reports of listed SPs like Linktone 
(NASDAQ: LTON), Kongzhong (NASDAQ: 
KONG), they all attribute d revenues decline during 
2004 and 2005 to application of MISC platform as 
the main affecting factor coincidentally. This also 
proved MISC platform played a role in rectifying 
misconducts of SPs. 
 
Analysis and discussion 
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This case reveals some beneficial implications, and 
we discuss our finding as follows. 
 
IOS-enabled process control 
The case studies revealed that one of the most 
important enablers of efficient process control is that 
an appropriate deployment and implementation of 
interorganizational information system (IOS) which 
can effectively reduce partners’ misconducts and 
thereby decrease the threat of opportunism. 
Some key value-added service processes was 
transformed after adoption of MISC, and the 
transformation effectively curb SPs’ opportunistic 
behaviors including modify business logic, enforcing 
subscription, hostile mass message sending et al. 
The IOS-enable process control plays a role in 
curbing opportunism from following aspects: 
1) Facilitate automatic monitoring. Employing 
IOS, the content delivered by SPs towards end users 
can be monitored automatically, non-compliance and 
ill messages will be blocked accordingly, thereby 
reduce SPs’ fraudulent behaviors. 
Automation by IOS helps to reduce process 
variance, thereby effectively reduce human 
intervention. e.g. IT always acts as an automatic tool 
of process implementing, which makes controllees’ 
act in accordance with prespecification. 
2) Automate key business process. The IOS 
replaces human to achieve certain key processes, 
facilitates information and data flow between MNO, 
service providers and end users without human 
intervention. 
3) Synchronize business process. IOS helps to 
increase process synchronicity which can effectively 
reduce human intervention. Employing IOS, many 
processes of previous independent business units can 
be synchronized with other business process to 
assure data reliability and reduce the possibility that 
partners will change business process logic privately. 
What’s more, synchronization makes sure that 
master data is harmonized and homogenized.  
4) Standardize business processes and increase 
business transparency. Through adding 
authentication of subscription and request, the IOS 
can effectively prevent SPs from leveraging entry 
traps to mislead end users. 
 
IOS-facilitated outcome control 
The influence taken by IOS on outcome control may 
not as obvious as on process control. However, 
Deployment and implementation of advanced IOS 
also benefit to outcome control by facilitating 
accurate measuring partners’ business performances. 
As [16] stated “without precise specification of 
the expected outcomes, outcome controls are 
subjective and ineffective”. The extensive use of 
IT/IS facilitates the efficient gathering of vast 
amounts of data, thereby forming more accurate 
measurement of partners’ output. Moreover, IOS is 
likely to create a relatively advantage for 
institutional over contractual governance mechanism 
[17], and controller can render more contingent 
incentive and outcome control over controllees. 
In effect, for purpose of curbing opportunism 
or strengthening partner relationship management 
(PRM), more comprehensive and restrictive partner 
evaluation is needed and depends on more 
information gathered. 
Employed by IOS, focal firm is facilitated to 
measure partners’ output from many more 
appropriate aspects, thereby adopt corresponding 
incentives and sanctions based on more contingent 
situation. For example, China Mobile can implement 
“Leveled management” towards SPs based on more 
comprehensive evaluation from both business 
performances and credit scores.  
 
Prerequisites for IOS-enabled control 
This case also highlight that only higher levels of 
external integration that go beyond simple 
procurement or communication systems allow focal 
firms to enhance formal control efficiency. That 
means some important conditions are supposed to be 
fulfilled to implement this IOS-enabled control. 
Firstly, IOS-enabled control demand focal firm 
have mature IT-capacity (e.g. China Mobile held 
majority stake in platform provider — ASPire 
Technologies to strengthen this capacity). Most of 
the businesses are carried on based on IT-
infrastructure, and thereby business intelligence (BI) 
can be widely supported. From the above analysis, 
whatever process control or PRM can’t be achieved 
without BI derived from mature IT-capacity. 
 Secondly, a reciprocal interdependent 
cooperation is demanded between focal firm and its 
partners. In effect, the resource complementarity of 
MNO and SPs means that they need to share mutual 
resources, exchange reciprocity, which are also 
essential enablers in implementing IOS.  
Thirdly, IT strategy should be integrated with 
partnering strategy with complementary incentive 
and sanction institution rather than a tool facilitating 
business process automatically or communication. In 
this case, whether a series of management 
approaches issued by China Mobile go behind or 
beyond IT construction, they can’t work effectively. 
IT provides MNO with flexible ability to deal with 




In this study, we raise the question of partners’ 
opportunism and its curbing mechanism in emerging 
MSP. From perspectives of organizational control 
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and IOS, we propose our central argument that an 
IOS-enabled process control can effectively curb 
opportunism, which is illustrated by using a typical 
case study. In our context, we implied that the IOS-
enabled process control is linked with focal firm’s 
mature IT capacity. In addition, the focal firm 
incorporated technology strategy and partnering 
strategy also contribute to the success of IOS-
enabled process control.  
We also discussed the prerequisites for efficient 
implementation of IOS-enabled control, not merely 
related to task characteristic, industrial context, the 
complementarity between institutional arrangement 
and IOS practices is highlighted as well. 
Several limitations still exist in this work. 
Firstly, our evidence rest on qualitative analysis of a 
typical case, we still need more quantitative data to 
support our results. Secondly, we focus our interest 
on IOS’s impact on formal control, but how IOS use 
affect informal control, like some relational 
governance mechanism, is still needed to be 
inspected in MSP further. 
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Appendix 
MISC is an integrated data services platform for 
operators to quickly activate a variety of data 
services and a powerful resource scheduling 
platform, providing functions such as customer 
management, order management and service 
provider management 
of mobile data services. It connects the network and 
business operations support system (customer 
service systems, operating systems, billing systems). 
It provide SPs with various telecommunications 
resources (such as Short Message Service Center, 
users’ information resources, voice system, fax 
system, etc.), functional resources (such as single 
point of authentication, billing, roaming control, 
personalization, etc.) and various public resources 
engine (such as text-to-speech, location, voice 
interaction, push information, etc.). MISC plays a 
"bridge" role in linking mobile operators and content 
providers, enables operators to launch a new 
business fastest and simpler; make content providers 
focus on content and applications development 
without considering more technical details about 
networks, thereby new value-added business can be 
provided more cheaply and quickly. Mobile users 
can access these businesses by using any terminal 
(WAP phone, PDA, PC, ordinary telephones, fax 
machines, etc.) with any method including SMS, 
WAP, WEB, voice/fax through "Monternet" portal. 
 
Table1 key processes reengineered before and after adoption of MISC 
Item After Upgrade Before upgrade 
Subscription records 
storage 
Subscription records are only stored by 
SP. 
Subscription records are stored in MISC and SP’s 




Notification of subscription is delivered 
by SP own 
Notification of subscription as well as canceling are 
delivered by MISC 
Subscription canceling Services canceling process is charged by SP own Services canceling process is automated by MISC 
Monthly charges  SP launched monthly charges request 
independently 
MISC launches monthly charges request based on 




No authentication of Subscription and 
request, all the messages were delivered 
to SP by gateway 





Subscription records were only stored by 
SP, no synchronization exist 
Subscription records were synchronized in MISC and 
SP’ system through Provision interface. 
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